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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, Sood-Sarje-Singh proposed two dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes. The first scheme 
is a security improvement of Liao et al.’s scheme and the second scheme is a security improvement of Wang et 
al.’s scheme. In both cases, the authors claimed that their schemes can resist many attacks. However, we find that 
both schemes have security flaws. In addition, their schemes require a verification table and time-synchronization, 
making the schemes unfeasible and unsecured for electronic services. In order to remedy the security flaws of 
Sood et al.’s schemes, we propose a robust scheme which resists the well-known attacks and achieves all the 
desirable security goals. 
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RESUMEN 
En el año 2010, Sood-Sarje-Singh propusieron dos esquemas de autenticación de usuario remoto. El primer 
esquema presenta una mejora de seguridad sobre el esquema propuesto por Liao-Lee-Hwang en el año 2005, y el 
segundo esquema presenta una mejora de seguridad sobre el esquema propuesto por Wang-Liu-Xiao-Dan en el año 
2009. En ambos casos, los autores claman que sus esquemas pueden resistir varios ataques. Sin embargo, nosotros 
hemos encontrado que ambos esquemas tienen deficiencias de seguridad. Además, los esquemas propuestos 
requieren de una tabla de verificación y sincronización de tiempo, haciendo a los esquemas imprácticos e inseguros 
para servicios electrónicos. Para remediar las deficiencias de seguridad presentadas en los esquemas propuestos 
por Sood-Sarje-Singh, nosotros proponemos un esquema robusto de seguridad que resiste los ataques más 
populares y consigue todas las metas de seguridad deseadas. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Remote user authentication is a key security 
component for electronic services, such as e-
banking and e-payments, in order to verify the real 
identity of each user. The most popular 
mechanism to carry out the authentication process 
is by means of password-based authentication 
protocols. However, the server must store and 
maintain the identities and password of each user 
in a database, making possible the insider attack 
[1], threats of revealing passwords in the directory 
[2] or modifying the verification table [3]. 
 
 
 
Although, many approaches have been proposed [4, 
5] to overcome the weakness of storing users’ identity 
and password in a database, using cryptography or 
one-way hash function, the security of the whole 
system can be broken if an attacker steals or modifies 
the information stored in the database. For this reason, 
Chan and Wu [6] proposed a remote user 
authentication scheme without a verification table, in 
1990. The next year, Chang and Wu [2] introduced the 
concept of timestamp in the login request message to 
prevent the replay attack. 
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In 2002, Chien et al. [7] proposed a remote user 
authentication scheme which requires low-
computational cost. However, Hsu [8] demonstrated 
that Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to parallel 
session attack. Moreover, Ku et al. [1] demonstrated 
that Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider 
attack and guessing attack.  
 
Das et al. introduced the concept of dynamic ID-
based [9] remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards in 2004. Their scheme prevents the 
possibilities of an attacker knowing user’s identity. 
However, the scheme is susceptible to insider attack, 
masquerade attack, and server spoofing attack [10, 
11, 12, 13]. Moreover, the scheme does not provide 
mutual authentication and does not establish a 
session key. Then, Liao et al. [12] and Wang et al. 
[10] proposed different schemes which resolve the 
security flaws of Das et al.’s scheme. However, Sood 
et al. [14, 15] demonstrated that Liao et al.’s and 
Wang et al.’s schemes are vulnerable to malicious 
user attack, impersonation attack, stolen smart card 
attack, and off-line password guessing attack. In both 
cases, authors claimed that their schemes are more 
secure than previous one. 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate that Sood et al.’s 
schemes [14, 15] have security drawbacks. We show 
that their schemes are still vulnerable to malicious 
user attack, stolen smart card attack, off-line ID 
guessing attack, impersonation attack, and server 
spoofing attack. In addition, their schemes are based 
on time-synchronization which it is still a problem [16, 
17, 18] in existing networks environments because 
the data transmission and processing delay is 
uncertain. Moreover, the server maintains a 
verification table giving the opportunity an adversary 
to steal information from database. In order to 
remedy these security drawbacks, we propose an 
improvement on both schemes with more security. 
As a result, our scheme can withstand well-known 
attacks. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves 
the following security goals [19, 20]: 1) no verification 
table; 2) users choose password freely; 3) no 
password reveal; 4) mutual authentication; 5) session 
key agreement; 6) user anonymity; and 7) efficiency 
for wrong password login. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, we review the schemes proposed by 
Sood-Sarje-Singh. Section 3 describes the 
cryptanalysis of Sood et al.’s schemes. In Section 
4, we show the details of the proposed scheme. In 
section 5, we carry out the security analysis of the 
proposed scheme. In section 6, we compare our 
scheme with Sood et al.’s schemes demonstrating 
the enhanced security. Finally, we present the 
conclusions in Section 7. 
 
2. Review of Sood-Sarje-Singh’s schemes 
 
In this section, we review the dynamic ID-based 
remote user authentication schemes [14, 15] 
proposed by Sood-Sarje-Singh. Each scheme is 
based on one-way hash function and it is composed 
of four phases – registration, login, verification, and 
password change. The notations used throughout 
this paper are summarized as follows: 
 
U: User 
ID: Identity of U 
PW: Password of U 
S: Server 
x, z: Secret keys of S 
b: Nonce 
h( ): One-way hash function 
SK: Session key between U and S 
ESK( ): Symmetric encryption using SK 
DSK( ): Symmetric decryption using SK 
: Exclusive-OR operation 
||: Concatenation operation 
Î: Represents a secure channel 
Æ: Represents an open channel 
 
2.1 First scheme 
 
Sood et al. proposed an improvement scheme [15] 
of Liao et la.’s scheme [12]. 
 
Registration phase: This phase is invoked when U 
wants to access S. The process is as follows: 
 
x U chooses her ID and PW 
x U Î S: ID, PW 
x S chooses a random value y 
x S computes: 
 N = h(PW)  h(y || ID)  h(x) 
 B = y  h(PW) 
 V = h(ID || PW)  PW 
 D = h(y || ID) 
x S stores y  x and ID  h(x) corresponding to D 
in a database 
x U Î S: smart card containing N, B, V, h( ) 
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Login phase: When U wants to login the remote S, 
she inserts her smart card into the smart card 
reader and keys her ID´ and PW´. Then, the smart 
card performs the following steps: 
 
x Computes: 
 V´ = h(ID´ || PW´)  PW´ 
x Compares: 
 V´ ?= V if holds, the identity of U is assured 
x After verification, the smart card computes: 
 y = B  h(PW) 
 h(x) = N  h(PW)  h(y || ID) 
 CID = h(y || ID)  h(h(x) || T) 
 M = h(h(x) || h(y) || T) 
x U Æ S: CID, M, T 
 
Verification and session key agreement phase: 
When S receives the login request message (CID, 
M, T) at time T’, S carries out the following steps: 
 
x Checks the validity of time interval, if (T’ – T)  
'T, S accepts the login request of U, otherwise 
the login request is rejected, where 'T is 
expected time interval for a transmission delay. 
x Computes: 
D´ = h(y || ID)´ = CID  h(h(x) || T) 
x Finds: 
D´ in its database 
x Extracts: 
y  x and ID  h(x) corresponding to D´ from its 
database 
x Recovers: 
y from y  x 
ID from ID  h(x) 
x Computes: 
M´ = h(h(x) || h(y) || T) 
x Compares: 
M´ ?= M 
Finally, U and S computes the session key SK = 
h(ID || y || h(x) || T) 
 
Password change phase: When U wants to 
change the password, she inserts the smart card 
into the smart card reader, keys her ID´ and 
PW´, and requests to change the password to 
new one, and then the smart card carries out the 
following operations: 
 
 
 
 
x Computes: 
 V´ = h(ID´ || PW´)  PW´ 
x Compares: 
 V´ ?= V 
x Requests to U a new password PWnew 
x Computes: 
 Nnew = N  h(PW)  h(PWnew) 
 Bnew = B  h(PW)  h(PWnew) 
 Vnew = h(ID || PWnew)  PWnew 
and updates the values N, B, and V stored in its 
memory with Nnew, Bnew, and Vnew 
 
2.2 Second scheme 
 
Sood et al. proposed an improvement scheme [14] 
of Wang et la.’s scheme [10]. 
 
Registration phase: This phase is invoked when U 
wants to access S. The process is as follows: 
 
x U chooses her ID and PW 
x U Î S: ID, PW 
x S chooses random value y 
x S computes: 
 N = h(ID || PW)  h(x) 
 A = h(ID || PW)  PW  h(y) 
 B = y  ID  PW 
 D = h(ID || y) 
x S stores y  x and ID  h(x) corresponding to D 
in a database 
x S Î U: smart containing N, A, B, h( ) 
 
Login phase: When U wants to login the remote 
server S, she inserts her smart card into the smart 
card reader and keys her ID* and PW*. Then, the 
smart card performs the following steps: 
 
x Computes: 
 y´ = B  ID´  PW´ 
 A´ = h(ID´ || PW´)  PW´  h(y´) 
x Compares: 
 A´ ?= A 
x After verification, the smart card computes: 
 h(x) = h(ID || PW)  N 
 CID = h(ID || y)  h(h(x) || T) 
 M = h(ID || h(x) || y || T) 
x U Æ S: CID, M, T 
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Verification and session key agreement phase:  
 
When S receives the request (CID, M, T) at time 
T’, S carries out the following steps: 
 
x Checks the validity of time interval, if (T’ – T)  
'T, S accepts the login request of U, otherwise 
the login request is rejected, where 'T is 
expected time interval for a transmission delay. 
x Computes: 
 D´ = h(y || ID)´ = CID  h(h(x) || T) 
x Finds: 
 D´ in its database 
x Recovers: 
 y  x and ID  h(x) corresponding to D´ from its 
database 
x Extracts: 
 y from y  x 
 ID from ID  h(x) 
x Computes: 
 M´ = h(ID || h(x) || y || T) 
x Compares: 
 M´ ?= M if holds, the legality of U is assured 
Finally, U and S computes the session key SK = 
h(h(x) || ID || T || y) 
 
Password change phase: When U wants to 
change the password, she inserts the smart card 
into the smart card reader, keys her ID´ and 
PW´, and requests to change the password to 
new one, and then the smart card carries out the 
following operations: 
 
x Computes: 
 y´ = B  ID´  PW´ 
 A´ = h(ID´ || PW´)  PW´  h(y´) 
x Compares: 
 A´ ?= A 
x Request to U a new password PWnew 
x Computes: 
 Nnew = h(ID || PWnew)  h(x) 
 Anew = h(ID || PWnew)  PWnew  h(y) 
 Bnew = y  ID  PWnew 
and updates the values N, A, and B stored in its 
memory with Nnew, Anew, and Bnew 
 
3. Cryptanalysis of Sood-Sarje-Singh’s schemes 
 
In this section, we demonstrate that Sood et al.’s 
schemes have security vulnerabilities which make
both schemes unfeasible and unsecured for 
electronic services. We assume that a legal user 
but malicious user is the adversary and she can 
extract security parameters stored in her smart 
card by means of different methods [21, 22]. 
 
3.1 First scheme 
 
In this sub-section, we evaluate the security of the 
scheme proposed by Sood-Sarje-Singh in [15]. 
 
3.1.1 Malicious user attack 
 
A legal but malicious user can know h(x) as 
follows: 
 
x Keys her ID´ and PW´ 
x Computes: 
 y´ = B  h(PW) 
 h(x) = h(PW)  h(y´ || ID)  N 
 
Here, h(x) is the same value for each legal user. It 
is obvious that h(x) is not well-protected 
 
3.1.2 Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
The legal but malicious user can intercept the login 
request message (CID, M, T) transmitted between 
U and S. At this moment, she knows CID, M, T, 
and h(x); for that reason, she can recover D = h(y || 
ID) from CID as follows: 
 
x Computes: 
 D´ = h(y || ID) = CID  h(h(x) || T) 
 
3.1.3 Stolen smart card attack 
 
Suppose that the legal but malicious user can 
obtain security parameters (N, B, V) from a legal 
U’s smart card. Now, she knows the following 
security parameters: h(x), D = h(y || ID), N = h(PW) 
 h(y || ID)  h(x), B = y  h(PW), V = h(ID || PW) 
 PW. Then, she can recover y from B as follows: 
 
x Computes: 
 h(PW)´ = N  D  h(x) 
 y´ = B  h(PW) 
 
The attacker knows y without known user’s PW 
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3.1.4 Off-line ID guessing attack 
 
The ID guessing attack is similar to password 
guessing attack described in [15], where the legal 
but malicious user attacks the password by picking 
random passwords. In this case, the attacker 
knows y and D = h(y || ID), so she needs to find the 
correct ID for D. The complexity of this attack 
depends on the length of ID. 
 
3.1.5 Impersonation attack 
 
The legal but malicious user can forge a login 
request message that can pass the verification 
process of S because she knows D, h(x), and y. 
The attacker performs the following process: 
 
x Computes: 
 h(y) 
 CID = D  h(h(x) || T) 
 M = h(h(x) || h(y) || T) 
x Sends an imitative login request message (CID, 
M, T) to S 
 
After S receives the login request message, S 
carries out the verification process and S will 
accept the login request because CID and M are 
equals to the valid login request message. 
Moreover, the attacker can compute the secret key 
SK = h(ID || y || h(x) || T) 
 
3.1.6 Server spoofing attack 
 
Because the legal but malicious user knows ID, y, 
and h(x), she can establish a secure 
communication with U as S. 
 
3.2 Second scheme 
 
In this sub-section, we evaluate the security of the 
scheme proposed by Sood-Sarje-Singh in [14]. 
 
3.2.1 Malicious user attack 
 
A legal but malicious user can extract h(x) from N 
as follows: 
 
x Keys her ID´ and PW´ 
x Computes: 
 h(x) = h(ID´ || PW´)  N 
 
Here, h(x) is the same value for each legal user. It 
is obvious that h(x) is not well-protected 
 
3.2.2 Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
The legal but malicious user can intercept the login 
request message (CID, M, T) transmitted between 
a legal user U and S. At this moment, she knows 
CID, M, T, and h(x); for that reason, she can 
recover D = h(y || ID) from CID as follows: 
 
x Computes: 
 D´ = h(ID || y) = CID  h(h(x) || T) 
 
3.2.3 Steal information from a database attack 
 
Suppose that the adversary can get access to the 
server and can copy the entire database to an external 
hard disk. Then, she can find D corresponding to D´ 
and extracts ID from ID  h(x). The whole scheme has 
been broken down in terms of security. 
 
4. Proposed scheme 
 
Based on Sood et al.’s schemes, we propose an 
improved scheme. The scheme is based on nonce 
instead of time-synchronization. Moreover, the 
server does not need to maintain a verification 
table. The scheme is composed of the following 
phases: registration, login, verification and session 
key agreement, and password change. 
 
4.1 Registration phase 
 
This phase is invoked when U wants to access S. 
The process is as follows: 
 
x U chooses her ID, PW and b 
x U computes h(ID || PW || b) 
x U Î S: ID, h(ID || PW || b) 
x S chooses random value y 
x S computes: 
 N = h(ID || h(x || z) || y)  h(ID || PW || b)  h(ID || 
y) 
 A = h(h(ID || h(x || z) || y)) 
 B = h(x || z)  h(h(x || z) || y)  ID 
x S Î U: smart containing N, A, B, y, h( ) 
Finally, U enters b into her smart card [23]. Note 
that U’s smart card contains N, A, B, y, b, h( ). 
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4.2 Login phase 
 
When U wants to login the remote server S, she 
inserts her smart card into the smart card reader 
and keys her ID´ and PW´. Then, the smart card 
performs the following steps: 
 
x Computes: 
 h(ID || h(x || z) || y)´ = N  h(ID´ || PW´ || b)  
h(ID´ || y) 
 A´ = h(h(ID || h(x || z) || y)´) 
x Compares: 
 A´ ?= A if holds, the identity of U is assured; 
otherwise, the process finalized 
x After verification, the smart card carries out the 
following operations: 
x Generates bnew as random number 
x Computes: 
 CID = h(ID || h(x || z) || y)*  h(ID || y)  bnew 
 SK = h(h(ID || y || bnew)) 
 M = ESK(h(ID || bnew)) 
x U Æ S: y, B, CID, M 
 
4.3 Verification and session key agreement phase 
 
When S receives the request (y, B, CID, M), S 
carries out the following steps: 
 
x Computes: 
 ID´ = h(x || z)  h(h(x || z) || y)  B 
x Verifies the format of ID´ if it is not correct the 
request is rejected; otherwise, the process 
continues 
 bnew´ = h(ID´ || h(x || z) || y)  h(ID´ || y)  CID 
 h(ID´ || bnew´)´ 
 SK = h(h(ID || y || bnew)) 
 h(ID || bnew) = DSK(M) 
x Compares: 
 h(ID || bnew)´ ?= h(ID || bnew) if it holds, the identity 
of U is assured; otherwise, the process finalized 
x Generates ynew 
x Computes: 
 Nnew = h(ID || h(x || z) || ynew)  h(ID || PW || bnew) 
 h(ID || ynew) 
 Anew = h(h(ID || h(x || z) || ynew)) 
 Bnew = h(x || z)  h(h(x || z) || ynew)  ID 
 C = h(Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew || bnew) 
 O = ESK(Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew) 
x S Æ U: O, C 
 
Upon receiving the login response message (O, 
C), U’s smart card performs the following 
operations: 
 
 (Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew) = DSK(O) 
 C´ = h(Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew || bnew) 
x Compares: 
 C´ ?= C if holds, the identity of S is assured; 
otherwise, the process finalized 
x Replaces N, A, B, y, and b by Nnew, Anew, Bnew, 
ynew, and bnew, respectively 
 
After successful mutual authentication process, U 
and S have the same session key SK = h(h(ID || y 
|| bnew)). 
 
4.4 Password change phase 
 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to 
change her PW with a new one (PWnew). She 
inserts her smart card into the smart card reader 
and keys her ID and PW, and requests to change 
password. Then, her smart card carries out the 
following process: 
 
x Computes: 
 h(ID || h(x || z) || y)* = N  h(ID || PW || b)  h(ID 
|| y) 
 A* = h(h(ID || h(x || z) || y)*) 
x Compares: 
 A* ?= A if holds, the identity of U is assured and 
U can key a new password (PWnew); otherwise, 
the smart card rejects the password change 
request 
x Computes: 
Nnew = h(ID || h(x || z) || y)  h(ID || PWnew || b)  
h(ID || y) 
 
The value of Nnew is stored in the smart card to 
replace N. 
 
5. Security analysis 
 
In this section, we demonstrate that our proposed 
scheme can resist very well-known attacks and 
achieves the desirable security goals described in [19, 
20]. Table 1 shows the security comparison between 
our proposed scheme and Sood et al.’s schemes. 
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5.1 Denial of service attack 
 
Suppose that the adversary can get access to the 
victim’s smart card and she wants to change the 
password. However, the adversary will fail in this 
attack because the smart card verifies the identity 
of the owner before updates or modifies the 
password for another one. 
 
5.2 Impersonation attack 
 
If an adversary wants to impersonate U, she 
must be able to forge a valid login message (y, 
B, CID, M). Suppose that the adversary has 
intercepted one of the victim’s login request 
message (y, B, CID, M) and she knows the 
security information (N, A, B, y, b, h( )) stored in 
victim’s smart card. However, she cannot 
compute a valid session key SK = h(h(ID || y || 
bnew)) without the knowledge of U’s ID and bnew 
because she cannot extract the correct ID from 
B = h(x || z)  h(h(x || z) || y)  ID or bnew from 
CID = h(ID || h(x || z) || y)  h(ID || y)  bnew. 
 
5.3 Malicious user attack 
 
A legal but malicious user can attempt to extract 
the server secret keys x and z from N = h(ID || h(x 
|| z) || y)  h(ID || PW || b)  h(ID || y) or B = h(x || 
z)  h(h(x || z) || y)  ID. However, this attempt will 
fail because it is computationally infeasible to 
invert the one-way hash function h( ). 
 
5.4 Off-line ID guessing attack 
 
If the adversary tries to obtains U's ID from N = 
h(ID || h(x || z) || y)  h(ID || PW || b)  h(ID || y), A 
= h(h(ID || h(x || z) || y)) or B = h(x || z)  h(h(x || z) 
|| y)  ID, she needs to guess three security 
parameters ID, x and z correctly at the same time 
which represents a higher challenge than just one 
security parameter. Moreover, the value of x and z 
are hidden by a one-way hash function. 
 
5.5 Parallel session attack 
 
If the adversary has intercepted the victim’s login 
request message (y, B, CID, M) and the login 
response message (O, C), she cannot compute a 
valid login request message by any combination of 
(y, B, CID, M) and (O, C). Moreover, the adversary 
cannot extract the U’s ID, ynew and bnew from C = 
h(Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew || bnew) or O = ESK(Nnew || 
Anew || Bnew || ynew). Furthermore, the adversary 
cannot compute the session key SK = h(h(ID || y || 
bnew)) because she does not ID and bnew. 
 
5.6 Replay attack 
 
If the adversary has intercepted the victim’s login 
request message (y, B, CID, M) and the login 
response message (O, C), she cannot compute a 
valid login request message by any combination of 
(y, B, CID, M) and (O, C). Moreover, the adversary 
cannot extract the U’s ID, ynew and bnew from C = 
h(Nnew || Anew || Bnew || ynew || bnew) or O = ESK(Nnew || 
Anew || Bnew || ynew). Furthermore, the adversary 
cannot know the session key SK = h(h(ID || y || 
bnew)) because she does not ID and bnew. 
 
5.7 Server spoofing attack 
 
Suppose that the adversary wants to impersonate 
S, she must be able to forge a valid login response 
message (O, C). However, this attempt will fail 
because the adversary cannot compute a valid SK 
= h(h(ID || y || bnew)) without the knowledge of x 
and z. Moreover, the adversary cannot compute a 
valid C or O without the correct U’s ID. 
 
5.8 Stolen smart card attack 
 
Suppose that the adversary has stolen victim’s 
smart card and she can access to the security 
information (N, A, B, y, b, h( )) stored in victim’s 
smart card. However, the adversary cannot obtain 
information for creating a valid login request 
message (y, B, CID, M) without the knowledge of 
ID and PW. 
 
6. Comparison 
 
Table 1 shows that our proposed scheme does not 
need a verification table for carrying out the 
verification phase. On the other hand, the schemes 
proposed by Sood et al. require that the server 
maintains a verification table which represents 
security vulnerability for the entire system. 
Moreover, the schemes proposed by Sood et al. 
require that each user reveals her password to S, 
during the registration phase, while our scheme 
keeps the privacy of U’s password. Furthermore, the 
proposed scheme uses nonce instead of time-
stamping, avoiding the time-synchronization 
problem between U and S. In fact, the proposed 
scheme is more secure than Sood et al.’s schemes. 
SecurityImprovementofTwoDynamicIDͲbasedAuthenticationSchemesbySoodͲSarjeͲSingh,R.MartínezͲPeláezetal./755Ͳ763
Vol.11,October2013762
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we analyzed two schemes by Sood-
Sarje-Singh and found that both schemes are 
unsecured. We proposed an improvement of 
Sood et al.’s schemes to overcome the security 
flaws without damage their merits. Moreover, 
Table 1 demonstrates that the improved scheme 
can achieve all the desirable security goals, such 
as without maintain a verification table and no 
time-synchronization. 
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